Attacking the Network Time Protocol

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### Rating (1--4):
+ 4: Strong Accept -- This paper has a place at a top security venue

### What did this paper do well?

+ The paper provided very through explanations of various NTPD attacks and recommendations on defending against such attacks. Details are plenty yet well organized.
+ The paper used detailed attack scenarios and did an excellent job at illustrating the vulnerabilities
+ The paper provided interesting statistics regarding vulnerable servers, giving readers good sense about the attack surface of each category of NTPD attacks.
+ Real-life impacts were confirmed by several related CVE releases.

### Where did this paper fall short?

+ Does not know exactly what will cause bad time server pinning attack to succeed. 

### What did you learn from reading this paper?

+ Different negative effects on different systems/protocols (TLS, DNSSec, RPKI,...) upon the NTP being compromised
+ Different ways to attack NTPD (on-path methods and off-path methods)
+ There are "holes" in current NTPD standards that can be exploited (in fact, different ntpd standards also react differently to the same exploit)
+ Classic TCP/IP attack strategies (like fragmentation) are still very valuable. 

### What questions do you have about the paper or the area?

+ How do clients and servers maintain the accuracy of the response packets (with time values within) considering network delays and other delays ?
+ What is the current state of mode 3 and mode 4 responses? Are mode 3 packets authenticated now?
+ Why most recent NTPD implementation allows poll field in KoDs to be more than 17??? (as a measure against DDOS ??)
+ Among all of the NTPD attack methods, which one is the most effective? How to prevent that attack?
+ Communication is usually 2 ways, how come the other end is not able to correct this end's time ?